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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
Carnell Turner seeks our permission to file a second 
habeas corpus application in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania in an attempt to vacate his 1996 sentence for 
crack cocaine distribution and conspiracy to distribute 
crack cocaine. Turner's proposed habeas corpus application 
invokes the new rule of constitutional law announced by 
the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
446 (2000). The legal issue presented by this case is 
whether the new rule found in Apprendi has been "made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court," such that Turner may file a second habeas corpus 
application in the District Court. Following the Supreme 
Court's recent pronouncements in Tyler v. Cain , 121 S. Ct. 
2478 (2001), we hold that Apprendi has not been "made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court," and accordingly will deny Turner permission to file 
a second application. 
 
I. 
 
According to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996, a second or successive habeas corpus 
application filed by a federal prisoner like Turner: 
 
       [M]ust be certified as provided in section 2244 by a 
       panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain-- 
 
        . . . 
 
        (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive 
       to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, 
       that was previously unavailable. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2255 P8. Section 2244 certification to which 
this provision refers is described in S 2244(b)(3), which sets 
forth the procedures and standards for applications in the 
court of appeals. Under these standards, Turner must 
make "a prima facie showing that the application satisfies 
the requirements" of subsection S 2244. Id. S 2244(b)(3)(C). 
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Therefore, reading S 2255 P in conjunction with S 2244, 
Turner must make a "prima facie showing" that his habeas 
corpus application contains "a new rule of constitutional 
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable," in order 
for us to grant him permission to file his application in the 
district court. See generally Reyes-Requena v. United 
States, 243 F.3d 893, 897-99 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
the interplay between S 2255 and S 2244). 
 
II. 
 
Turner's application contains an Apprendi claim. In 
Apprendi, the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that 
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 
490. For purposes of this opinion, we need not address the 
intricacies of Apprendi, but suffice it to say that the case 
has generated quite a stir in the legal community, and has 
important implications for the conduct of criminal trials 
and sentencing. See, e.g., id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) (stating that Apprendi "will surely be 
remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law"); 
United States v. Mack, 229 F.3d 226, 236 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(Becker, C.J., concurring) (noting that Apprendi 's 
implications have generated "enormous controversy," and 
that Apprendi claims may "reach tidal proportions"). It is 
not surprising, then, that the parties agree that Apprendi 
establishes "a new rule of constitutional law." They also 
agree that this new rule was "previously unavailable" to 
Turner, because it was announced more than a year after 
his first S 2255 motion was decided.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At the time of his first S 2255 filing, Apprendi's "new rule" was also 
"previously unavailable" to Turner in the sense that the Apprendi 
argument that he now advances in his second application was foreclosed 
by a large body of settled precedent. In other words, whenever a 
Supreme Court decision, like Apprendi, "marks a `clear break with the 
past,' " that rule " `will almost certainly have been' previously 
unavailable 
in the requisite sense." Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 
2000) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 17 (1984)). 
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Therefore, the only issue we need decide is whether 
Turner can make a prima facie showing that Apprendi has 
been "made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 
Supreme Court."2 Fortuitously, the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Tyler greatly simplifies this inquiry, and dictates 
our response. In Tyler, which overruled our earlier decision 
in West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 2000), the Court 
explained that a new rule is not "made retroactive to cases 
on collateral review" unless the Court itself holds it to be 
retroactive. Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2482. As the Court 
explained: 
 
       The Supreme Court does not "make" a rule retroactive 
       when it merely establishes principles of retroactivity 
       and leaves the application of those principles to lower 
       courts. In such an event, any legal conclusion that is 
       derived from the principles is developed by the lower 
       court (or perhaps by a combination of courts), not by 
       the Supreme Court. 
 
Id. 
 
The government correctly points out that no Supreme 
Court case specifically holds that Apprendi is retroactive on 
collateral review, because the Court has yet to consider that 
precise question. The government concludes that under 
Tyler, this alone means that we must dismiss Turner's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government also maintains that in order for us to grant Turner's 
motion, he must make a "prima facie" showing that he has a meritorious 
Apprendi claim in the first place. Turner disputes this requirement, 
arguing that we need not, and should not, engage the merits of his claim 
at this point, but leave that task for the District Court. Although the 
government fails to identify any specific language in the statute that 
would support its interpretation, this interpretation apparently enjoys 
some support in the courts of appeals. E.g., Reyes-Requena v. United 
States, 243 F.3d 893,899 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that a prima facie 
showing means "a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller 
exploration by the district court") (quoting Bennett v. United States, 119 
F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997)). We need not rule on this issue, however, 
because even if we assume that Turner need not make a prima facie 
showing of a meritorious Apprendi claim at this stage, he still must make 
a prima facie showing that Apprendi has been"made retroactive to cases 
on collateral review by the Supreme Court," a requirement that he 
cannot satisfy. Infra pp. 7-9. 
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petition, because only the Supreme Court itself can"make" 
a case retroactive on collateral review. 
 
The government's interpretation of Tyler, however, is 
overly simplistic.3 Justice O'Connor, who supplied the 
crucial fifth vote for the majority, wrote a concurring 
opinion, and her reasoning adds to our understanding of 
the impact of Tyler. She explains that it is possible for the 
Court to "make" a case retroactive on collateral review 
without explicitly so stating, as long as the Court's holdings 
"logically permit no other conclusion than that the rule is 
retroactive." Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In other 
words, contrary to the government's position, just because 
the Court has never specifically considered the retroactivity 
of Apprendi does not foreclose the possibility that the Court 
has "made" Apprendi retroactive on collateral review. 
 
For example, Justice O'Connor explained that: 
 
       [I]f we hold in Case One that a particular type of rule 
       applies retroactively to cases on collateral review and 
       hold in Case Two that a given rule is of that particular 
       type, then it necessarily follows that the given rule 
       applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. In 
       such circumstances, we can be said to have "made" the 
       given rule retroactive to cases on collateral review. 
 
Id. at 2485-86. But Justice O'Connor qualified this 
approach by explaining that: 
 
       The relationship between the conclusion that a new 
       rule is retroactive and the holdings that "ma[k]e" this 
       rule retroactive, however, must be strictly logical-- i.e, 
       the holdings must dictate the conclusion and not 
       merely provide principles from which one may 
       conclude that the rule applies retroactively. 
 
Id. at 2486 (emphasis in original). In sum, under Tyler, it 
is not enough that the new rule in Apprendi is arguably 
retroactive; rather, we will grant Turner permission to file a 
second habeas corpus application in the district court only 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Nevertheless, this interpretation of Tyler  has apparently prevailed in 
at 
least one of our sister circuit courts of appeals. E.g., Browning v. 
United 
States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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if Supreme Court holdings dictate the conclusion that the 
new rule in Apprendi has been made retroactive to cases on 
collateral review. 
 
Turner advances two principal arguments in support of 
the idea that the Court's holdings "dictate" that Apprendi 
applies retroactively on collateral review. First, he argues 
that the "new rule" announced by Apprendi  is a substantive 
rule (as opposed to a procedural one) and that substantive 
rules automatically enjoy retroactive effect on collateral 
review. And second, he argues that Apprendi is an 
extension of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), which the 
Supreme Court has held fully retroactive, and therefore by 
logical necessity, Apprendi must be retroactive on collateral 
review as well. Neither of these arguments, however, 
persuades us that the Supreme Court has "made" Apprendi 
retroactive to cases on collateral review, in the sense that 
Tyler requires. 
 
We agree with Turner that when analyzing a "new rule," 
the first question to ask is whether the rule is substantive 
or procedural in nature, because "the Supreme Court has 
created separate retroactivity standards for new rules of 
criminal procedure and new decisions of substantive 
criminal law." United States v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669, 676 
(3d Cir. 1993). Under the substantive retroactivity 
standard, the appropriate inquiry is whether the claimed 
legal error was a " `fundamental defect which inherently 
results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' and whether `it 
presents exceptional circumstances where the need for the 
remedy afforded' by collateral relief is apparent." Id. 
(quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)). 
In contrast, new rules of criminal procedure are given 
retroactive effect on collateral review only if they can satisfy 
one of two narrow exceptions described in Teague v. Lane, 
489 U.S. 288 (1989). First, "a court should apply a new 
criminal procedural rule retroactively if `it places certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the 
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.' " 
Woods, 986 F.2d at 677 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 306). 
And second, "under Teague a court should apply a new 
procedural rule retroactively if `it requires the observance of 
those procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of 
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ordered liberty.' " Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 306). As 
is apparent from the above discussion, Turner is incorrect 
to assert that new substantive rules automatically receive 
retroactive effect on collateral review. Rather, such rules 
must meet the standard that we described in Woods. 
 
More importantly, the Supreme Court's holdings certainly 
do not "dictate" that the new rule in Apprendi is 
substantive -- rather than procedural -- in nature. Turner 
characterizes the new rule in Apprendi as a substantive 
rule of constitutional law because it forces the government 
to treat certain facts as the equivalent of substantive 
offense elements (and thus submit them to a jury and prove 
them beyond a reasonable doubt), which otherwise would 
be mere sentencing factors determined by a judge. On the 
other hand, the government characterizes the new rule as 
purely procedural in nature, because the rule imposes 
certain procedural requirements (namely, submission to a 
jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt) for the 
establishment of certain facts. 
 
Significantly, the government's interpretation enjoys the 
support of the vast majority of courts to consider the issue. 
E.g., United States v. Hernandez, 137 F.Supp.2d 919, 929 
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (noting that "most courts that have 
addressed the retroactivity of Apprendi have[assumed] . . . 
without discussion that the decision announced a 
constitutional rule of criminal procedure"); Levan v. United 
States, 128 F.Supp.2d 270, 276 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating 
that "Apprendi constitutes a procedural rule because it 
dictates what fact-finding procedure must be employed to 
ensure a fair trial"); Ware v. United States , 124 F.Supp.2d 
590, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (same). But see Darity v. United 
States, 114 F.Supp.2d 355, 361 (W.D.N.C. 2000) 
(characterizing Apprendi as a "substantive change in the 
law"), overruled by United States v. Sanders , 247 F.3d 139, 
146-151 (4th Cir. 2001). For the purposes of our analysis, 
however, we need not choose between these competing 
interpretations of Apprendi. It is enough for us to note that 
the new rule in Apprendi is merely arguably substantive -- 
certainly, no Supreme Court holdings "dictate" that 
Apprendi establishes a substantive rule of law-- and 
therefore, in light of the strict Tyler standard, Turner's 
argument must fail. 
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Turner's second argument is similarly flawed. According 
to In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), a defendant cannot 
be convicted of a crime "except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364. Turner points 
out that the Court has subsequently held both Winship and 
certain extensions of Winship to be fully retroactive. E.g., 
Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 242-44 (1977); 
Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204-05 (1972). 
Turner describes the new rule in Apprendi as simply an 
extension and application of the basic Winship  rule, and 
therefore concludes that Apprendi, like Winship, must be 
applied retroactively on collateral review. 
 
Even if we assume that Turner is correct to describe the 
new rule in Apprendi as simply a new extension and 
application of Winship, this does not mean that Supreme 
Court holdings "dictate" that Apprendi be applied 
retroactively to cases on collateral review. Instead, Turner 
finds himself in essentially the same position as the 
petitioner in Tyler, who argued that the rule contained in 
Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), had been"made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme 
Court." Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2483-85. In Cage, the Court 
described the issue before it as "whether the reasonable- 
doubt instruction in this case complied with Winship," and 
ultimately concluded that "the instruction at issue was 
contrary to the `beyond a reasonable doubt' requirement 
articulated in Winship." Cage, 498 U.S. at 40-41. In other 
words, Cage was a straightforward extension and 
application of Winship -- just as Turner characterizes 
Apprendi -- and yet the Tyler Court rejected the petitioner's 
argument, observing that "[t]he most he can claim is that 
. . . this Court should make Cage retroactive to cases on 
collateral review. What is clear, however, is that we have 
not `made' Cage retroactive to cases on collateral review." 
Tyler, 121 S. Ct. at 2484 (emphasis in original). Similarly, 
the most that Turner can claim is that the Supreme Court 
should make Apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral 
review, and not that existing Supreme Court holdings 
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dictate that result. Accordingly, Turner cannot satisfy the 
Tyler standard.4 
 
In sum, we will deny Turner's request for leave to file a 
second habeas corpus application in the district court 
because he cannot make a "prima facie showing" that his 
habeas corpus application contains "a new rule of 
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 
unavailable." We note, however, that our decision does not 
address the underlying merits of Turner's Apprendi claim. 
Accordingly, we will deny Turner's motion without prejudice 
in the event that the Supreme Court subsequently makes 
Apprendi retroactive to cases on collateral review. E.g., 
Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 
2001). 
 
In accordance with the foregoing, Carnell Turner's motion 
for leave to file a second habeas corpus application in the 
district court will be DENIED without prejudice. 
4. Turner also makes an alternative attempt to satisfy Tyler by arguing 
that the new rule in Apprendi meets the standards for retroactivity of 
new procedural rules articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
Turner concedes that Apprendi does not satisfy the first Teague 
exception, but suggests that it meets the second Teague exception as a 
new procedural rule that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311. However, Turner does not press this point, 
most likely because any attempt to fit Apprendi  within the Teague 
framework would flatly contradict his argument that Apprendi 
announces a new rule of substantive law, and is therefore outside the 
ambit of Teague altogether. Moreover, even if we assume that the new 
rule in Apprendi falls within the Teague  framework, the most we can say 
is that Apprendi arguably satisfies Teague's second exception -- not that 
Supreme Court holdings "dictate" that result-- as evidenced by the 
disagreement on this issue in the federal courts. E.g., United States v. 
Pinkston, 2001 WL 823470, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 17, 2001) (collecting 
cases). Thus, Teague cannot assist Turner in meeting his burden under 
Tyler. 
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